What are the options for integrating libertarian free will into the table?

The question of integrating libertarian free will—the view that agents possess the ability to make genuinely open choices not determined by prior states—into a coherent metaphysical framework presents a central challenge in philosophy. Key options attempt to reconcile this radical freedom with a scientific worldview. One prominent model is Agent Causation, which posits that agents, as substances, can initiate causal chains *sui generis*, not merely as links in prior physical events. This places the self as an uncaused cause of actions. Alternatively, Non-Causal or Teleological theories argue that free actions are explained by reasons or purposes, not by preceding causes, thereby avoiding deterministic chains. Some frameworks incorporate Indeterminism at the point of conscious deliberation, suggesting that probabilistic neural events allow for alternative possibilities without dictating the choice. However, critics highlight the "problem of luck," questioning how undetermined choices can be responsibly attributed to the agent. A more moderate approach, often labeled Revisionist Libertarianism, seeks to refine the concept of control within an indeterministic setting. Ultimately, integrating libertarian free will requires navigating between the Scylla of deterministic physicalism and the Charybdis of random chance, aiming to preserve a robust foundation for moral responsibility and authentic agency. The debate continues to explore whether any model can satisfactorily fulfill these criteria without appealing to dualistic or supernatural premises.